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Duchess Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Nev. St. Bd. of Pharmacy 
124 Nev. Adv. Op. 32 
 (May 29, 2008)1 
 




Two pharmaceutical wholesalers appeal from the district court’s denial of a petition for 
judicial review of an order by respondent Nevada State Board of Pharmacy (the Board) revoking 
the wholesalers’ licenses for violations of Nevada’s statutes and regulations governing the 
secondary prescription drug market.  The wholesalers appeal on multiple grounds, three of which 
raise issues of first impression: (1) an administrative agency’s discretion concerning joinder in an 
administrative proceeding; (2) an administrative agency’s discretion with respect to discovery in 
an administrative proceeding; and (3) whether intent must be proven to render an entity liable for 




 Reversed and remanded to recalculate the imposed fines.  In regards to an administrative 
agency’s discretion to decide joinder and discovery issues during an administrative proceeding, 
the Court concludes that in the absence of a rule, statute, or regulation governing that proceeding, 
issues such as joinder and discovery are left to the agency’s discretion.  Concerning liability 
under NRS § 585.520(1), the plain language of the statute does not require intent for its 
violation, thus the Board may find that the licensee violated the statute without proving its intent 
to cause harm or violate the statute.  As to the multiple other arguments, the Court finds them all 
to be without merit except one – the Board erred in concluding that a company Dutchess 
transacted with required a license at the time, and the fines must be accordingly recalculated. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 The Board regulates the practice of pharmacy in Nevada through various responsibilities.  
It licensed Dutchess and Legend as pharmaceutical wholesalers in 1998 and 2002, respectively.  
Pharmaceutical wholesalers purchase pharmaceuticals from manufacturers, wholesalers, and 
pharmacies, and resell the pharmaceuticals to other wholesalers and pharmacies. 
 
 Over a three-year period, Dutchess, and then Legend as Dutchess’ successor company, 
conducted business with several questionable entities.  This business formed the basis of the 
Board’s investigation.  In August 2003, the Board filed a Notice of Intended Action and 
Accusation against Dutchess and Legend, accusing them of buying and selling adulterated and 
misbranded prescription drugs; failing to make, maintain, and provide accurate pedigrees 
detailing the sources of the drugs; failing to make, keep, and provide accurate records of their 
                                                 
1 Summarized by Danielle Tarmu 
2 NEV. REV. STAT. § 585.520(1) prohibits “[t]he manufacture, sale or delivery, holding or offering for sale of any 
food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded.” 
purchases; and purchasing drugs from unlicensed distributors.  The three drugs bought and sold 
by the companies that formed the basis of the Board’s action were Lupron (manufactured by 
TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.), Zoladex (manufactured by AstraZeneca), and Serostim 
(manufactured by EMD Serono, Inc.).  Dutchess dealt with shipments of the drugs from 
wholesalers Crystal Coast, Inc., Genendo Purchasing Organization, Xenigen, Inc., and Rekcus, 
and Legend dealt only with Rekcus.   
 
 Although Crystal Coast represented itself as an authorized distributor of Serostim, it was 
not an authorized distributor.  Dutchess purchased numerous boxes of Serostim from Crystal 
Coast at prices below the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (“WAC”) and almost half of the boxes 
were counterfeit Serostim.  In late 2000, Serono became aware that counterfeit Serostim was 
being distributed and notified pharmacists and its customers, including Dutchess.  Despite its 
notification of the counterfeit drug, Dutchess did not ask Crystal Coast to provide invoices to 
demonstrate its source of Serostim.  The Board found that these facts should have caused 
Dutchess to discover Crystal Coast’s questionable distributor status. 
 
 Genendo and Xenigen falsely represented they were authorized distributors of Lupron 
and Zoladex, and Rekcus falsely represented that it was an authorized distributor of Lupron.  
Dutchess and Legend bought Lupron at prices below WAC, and Dutchess bought Zoladex at 
prices below WAC.  For certain pharmaceutical purchases, Dutchess maintained two sets of 
pedigrees, one listing Cactus RX3 as the original seller and authorized distributor, and the other 
set identifying a chain of wholesalers who handled the drug before reaching Dutchess.  The 
Board found that the chain had been “crudely redacted.”  Dutchess had various other 
questionable record-keeping practices, such as misrepresenting its sources of drugs to its 
customers.  Dutchess also provided limited, questionable shipping records at the hearing.  The 
records showed that although Dutchess was conducting business with Crystal Coast, it received 
few of its shipments from Crystal Coast’s licensed address and received several shipments from 
Overseas International, an unlicensed wholesaler.  Dutchess did not provide any shipping records 
for its transactions with Genendo, Xenigen, and Rekcus, and Legend did not provide records for 
its transactions with Rekcus. 
 
 The Board held a hearing on the charges listed in the accusation and unanimously 
determined that Dutchess and Legend were guilty of 11 violations of Nevada pharmacy law.  It 
revoked the companies’ pharmaceutical wholesaler’s licenses and fined both companies.  
Dutchess and Legend petitioned for judicial review and the district court denied the petition in 
totality, except it remanded it to the Board to reconsider the fines.  On remand, the Board 





 On appeal, Dutchess and Legend argue that the Board (a) lacked jurisdiction to discipline 
them, (b) improperly enjoined them as defendants at the administrative hearing causing them 
undue prejudice, (c) deprived them of their due process rights by denying them the right to 
conduct discovery and finding them guilty of charges not listed in the accusation, (d) applied 
                                                 
3 The record is unclear as to whether Dutchess actually conducted business with the wholesaler Cactus RX. 
incorrect legal standards and misinterpreted certain statutes and regulations, (e) rendered its 
decision without substantial supporting evidence, (f) acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and (g) 
impermissibly pierced their corporate veils to add certain employees as alter egos. 
 
a. The Board had jurisdiction to discipline Dutchess and Legen 
 
 Although the subject transactions occurred outside Nevada, Dutchess and Legend were 
licensed as pharmaceutical wholesalers in the State of Nevada.  NRS § 639.210 gives the Board 
jurisdiction over Nevada license holders and authorizes it to revoke licenses.  NRS § 639.255 
authorizes the Board to impose fines for each count of an accusation, according to a schedule of 
fines.  These statutes are plain and unambiguous, thus the Court will not look beyond the 
language to ascertain legislative intent.  Nothing in NRS § 639.210 limits the Board’s 
jurisdiction to acts occurring solely within Nevada.  Licensees who commit acts of 
unprofessional conduct and other acts that breach the statute thus violate the public interest of the 
state; therefore the Board has jurisdiction to discipline and impose penalties on Dutchess and 
Legend. 
 
b. The Board properly joined Dutchess and Legend 
 The companies argue they were improperly joined because they did not participate in the 
same transactions constituting the offenses, but the Court finds the argument unpersuasive.  
There is an absence of Nevada law governing joinder of parties in administrative proceedings 
because NRCP binds only district courts, not state agencies unless the agency expressly adopts 
the rules.  Even so, the Court holds that the Board was within its discretion to join Dutchess and 
Legend because such a determination is within the broad scope of discretion afforded to the 
Board as an administrative agency.4  The evidence showed that Legend acquired Dutchess in a 
stock purchase, that Legend and Dutchess both operated at the same facilities, and that Legend 
continued transactions with Rekcus after Dutchess ended its own operations.  The companies 
also failed to establish that they suffered undue prejudice as a result of joinder.  Although they 
allege that the Board penalized Legend for aspects of Dutchess’ wrongdoing, the Board did not 
fine Legend for Dutchess’ violations. 
 
c. The Board did not deprive Dutchess and Legend of their due process rights 
 
 Dutchess and Legend argue that the Board violated their due process rights by (1) failing 
to provide them with adequate notice of the factual basis for the charges in the accusation, (2) 
finding them guilty of charges not listed in the accusation, and (3) denying them the ability to 
conduct discovery or providing a list of witnesses. 
 
 The companies received adequate notice of the charges.  Although proceedings before an 
administrative agency are more relaxed, guarantees of due process still apply.5  Under NRS 
§ 639.241, the Board is required to initiate the administrative hearing process by filing an 
accusation against the entity whose license it seeks to revoke, setting forth the charges.  The 
Board must also serve a copy of the accusation on the respondent.6  These procedural 
                                                 
4 See American Beef Packers, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t Agric., 486 F.2d 1048, 1049 (8th Cir. 1973). 
5 Bivins Constr. V. State Contractors’ Bd., 107 Nev. 281, 283, 809 P.2d 1268, 1270 (1991). 
6 NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.242(1). 
requirements comport with minimum standards of due process by ensuring that the respondent is 
apprised of the charges against it and the factual bases for them.  Dutchess and Legend received 
the Board’s accusation, which stated the factual bases for the charges, thus their due process 
rights were not violated. 
 
 The Board did not adjudicate the companies guilty of charges that were not listed in the 
accusation.  The companies asserts that while the Board found Dutchess guilty of providing 
inaccurate pedigrees, the closest cause of action in the accusation alleged that Dutchess falsely 
represented itself as an authorized dealer. They argue that this discrepancy failed to provide 
notice to Dutchess of the charge so Dutchess was unable to defend against it.  NRS § 639.241 
requires the Board to give notice in the accusation of the alleged charges.  Due process 
requirements are satisfied when the parties are sufficiently apprised of the nature of the 
proceedings so that there is no unfair surprise and can prepare a defense.7  Here, the language in 
the Board’s accusation clearly and unambiguously notified Dutchess that it was charged with 
failing to provide accurate pedigrees and the Board found the company guilty of this charge.  
Therefore, the companies’ argument that they were found guilty of charges not listed in the 
accusation is without merit. 
 
 Dutchess and Legend do not have a constitutional right to pre-hearing discovery.  There 
is no state or federal constitutional right in administrative proceedings to pre-hearing discovery 
that would require disclosure of intended witnesses,8 as the companies argue.  Furthermore, the 
Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to administrative proceedings,9 and Nevada’s 
Administrative Procedure Act does not provide for discovery.  NRS § 233B.040(1) authorizes 
administrative agencies to adopt regulations to aid in carrying out their duties.  The Board has 
not established any procedures allowing for discovery and no statutes require it, thus it is within 
their discretion to decline to do so. 
 
 Although the Board has not adopted provisions allowing for discovery, due process 
guarantees of fundamental  fairness still apply. NRS § 639.246(1) requires the Board to issue 
subpoenas on behalf of any party to an action before the Board to produce witnesses or 
documents.  Therefore, Dutchess and Legend had a procedural mechanism to obtaining evidence 
necessary to their defense, and do not deny the Board’s assertion that it subpoenaed all the 
evidence Dutchess and Legend requested.  Moreover, NRS § 639. 2485(2) provides that the 
complaint and other documents filed by the Board to be public records.  Therefore, the 
companies had access to any statements of potential witnesses that the Board considered.  
Because the Board’s procedures to subpoena witnesses and provide access to their statements 
comport with due process requirements, the companies failed to establish that the Board 





                                                 
7 Nevada St. Apprenticeship v. Joint Appren., 94 Nev. 763, 765, 587 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1978). 
8 See Kelly v. U.S. E.P.A., 203 F.3d 519, 523 (7th Cir. 2000); Cimarusti v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336, 342 
(Ct. App. 2000); McClelland v. Andrus, 606 F.2d 1278, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
9 See NRCP 1. 
 
d. The Board properly applied the law 
 
 Dutchess and Legend allege that the Board applied an incorrect legal standard in reaching 
several of its conclusions of law.  The Court concludes that all but one of the companies’ 
arguments lack merit. 
 
 The companies argue that the Board improperly applied a strict liability standard when it 
determined that Dutchess had violated NRS § 585.520(1), which prohibits transactions involving 
adulterated or misbranded foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics.  The companies argue that the 
administrative hearing was at least a quasi-criminal proceeding, so the requirements for imposing 
criminal liability should apply.  Although NRS § 585.550 provides for criminal penalties, it 
enables the attorney general or district attorney, not the Board, to prosecute criminal violations of 
Chapter 585.  In holding the hearings, the Board was not adjudicating criminal violations and 
was therefore not bound to apply criminal standards in the proceeding against Dutchess and 
Legend.  Although the companies further contend that NRS § 585.520 contains a knowledge 
requirement, this argument is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.  The statute’s language 
prohibits the sale or delivery of adulterated or misbranded drugs, with no mention of a 
knowledge requirement.  That the statute does not contain a knowledge requirement is further 
supported by the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of NRS § 585.520(1)’s federal 
counterpart in section 331(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.  In United States v. 
Dotterweich, the Court held that section 331 did not contain a knowledge requirement.10  The 
Court explained that the Act was intended to protect consumers, and although imposing liability 
without consciousness of wrongdoing may be harsh, the burden was more properly borne by 
shippers rather than the general public.11  Based on the plain language of NRS § 585.520(1) and 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of its federal counterpart, the Court holds that NRS 
§ 585.520(1) does not contain a knowledge requirement.  Therefore, the Board did not err by 
interpreting the statute as such. 
 
 Dutchess and Legend similarly argue that the Board applied an incorrect knowledge 
requirement with respect to the parties’ violations of various other statutes and regulations.  As 
discussed above, however, the Board was not adjudicating the companies’ culpability for alleged 
criminal violations.  It was acting on its authority under NRS § 639.255 to discipline license 
holders for statutory violations; therefore the Board was not applying criminal knowledge or 
intent requirements when it was determining whether the companies violated the statutes and 
regulations. 
 
 Dutchess and Legend argue that the Board erred when it determined that Dutchess had 
violated NRS § 639.210(4) and (12) and NAC 639.945(1)(g), (h), and (i) when it transacted with 
Overseas International.  The companies argue that the Board erred because (1) NRS § 639.233 
did not require a company like Overseas to maintain a license at the time its transactions with 
Dutchess took place, and (2) even if Overseas was required to maintain a license, Dutchess never 
bought drugs from Overseas because Overseas was merely a shipping agent.  The Court agrees 
with this agreement and concludes that the Board erred in reaching this conclusion of law.  
                                                 
10 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943). 
11 Id. 
 While NRS § 639.233(1) requires wholesalers who furnish drugs to people to be licensed, 
in 2003 the statute exempted from the licensing requirements those wholesalers or manufacturers 
whose principal place of business was in another state.12  Therefore, Overseas was not then 
required to be licensed in Nevada to sell controlled substances to Dutchess, and the Board erred 
in ruling that Dutchess’ transactions were unprofessional under NRS § 639.210(4) and violating 
regulations under NRS § 639.210(12).  Accordingly, on remand from the district court, the Board 
should recalculate the fines imposed on Dutchess. 
 
 Dutchess and Legend argue that the Board erred when it determined that Dutchess 
violated NAC § 639.602 when it failed to maintain and provide records to the Board showing the 
names and addresses of the locations from which drugs were shipped to Dutchess.  However, this 
regulation clearly requires wholesalers to maintain shipping records and as a wholesaler, 
Dutchess was subject to this requirement.  Accordingly, the Board made no error in its 
conclusion. 
 
e. The Board’s orders are not arbitrary and capricious 
 
 The companies argue that the Board’s orders are arbitrary and capricious because (1) the 
Board did not cite to authority to justify its imposition of fines, (2) the Board fined Legend for 
Serostim that it never handled, (3) the fines against the companies and the revocation of 
Legend’s license are excessive given mitigating circumstances, and (4) the Board cited to a 
repealed statute to authorize the imposition of attorney fees on the companies.  In regards to the 
first argument, NRS § 639.255 allows the Board to impose fines on a licensed wholesaler as a 
method of discipline for every count charged, as long as the fine does not exceed $10,000 per 
count.  The Board’s fines were within these limits, and its order was not arbitrary or capricious 
because it failed to cite to the statute. 
 
 As to the second argument, the Board fined Legend for only 125 of the 249 counts 
mentioned, which indicates that the Board recognized that Legend bought and sold only Lupron 
and not Serostim and Zoladex, and fined Legend only for drugs it handled. In regards to the third 
argument, it merely reiterates evidence presented during the hearing.  The Board’s imposition of 
fines and revocation of licenses are entitled to great deference, therefore the Court will not 
reconsider the Board’s determination.  As to the final argument, the Board admits it inadvertently 
cited to NRS § 639.255 when it should have cited NRS § 622.400(1)(a), which authorizes 
attorney fees for administrative hearings.  The Court will not reverse a correct judgment simply 
because it was based on the improper statutory authority, and thus the order is not arbitrary and 
capricious. 
 
f. The Board did not pierce Dutchess’ and Legend’s corporate veils 
 
 The companies argue that the Board impermissibly pierced their corporate veils when, in 
its order, it instructed Board staff to seek payment of the fines from Paul DeBree and Lance 
Packer, employees of the companies.  The Court disagrees.  Nothing in NRS Chapter 639 
suggests that the Board has authority to pierce the corporate veil.  Moreover, if the Board wished 
to pierce the veils, it would have to institute a separate action to do so.  The order’s language was 
                                                 
12 NRS 639.233(2) (2002). 
a directive to the Board staff regarding further action, and the Board does not have a valid 





The Court holds that (1) because the companies held licenses issued by the Board, the 
Board had jurisdiction under NRS § 639.210 to discipline them even though the business 
transactions took place out of state; (2) as an administrative body, the Board was within its 
discretion to join Dutchess and Legend and neither party was unduly prejudiced; (3) the 
companies received adequate notice of the charges against them; (4) in administrative 
proceedings, there is no due process right to discovery and the companies were not entitled to 
conduct discovery; (5) the Board adjudicated the companies guilty of charges listed in the 
accusation; (6) the Board applied the proper legal standards in all but one of its conclusions of 
law; (7) the Board’s orders are not arbitrary and capricious; and (8) the Board did not pierce the 
companies’ corporate veil.  Because the statute in effect in 2003 exempted Overseas from 
Nevada’s licensing requirements, the Board erred in determining that Dutchess violated Nevada 
law by conducting business with Overseas.  The Court reverses the district court’s denial of the 
petition for judicial review and remands it to recalculate the fines imposed on Dutchess 
according to this ruling. 
